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Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

Note by the Secretary-General

1. The report of the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization covering the year 2017 is hereby transmitted to the General Assembly pursuant to the provisions of article IV, paragraph 1, of the Agreement to Regulate the Relationship between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission (General Assembly resolution 54/280, annex).

2. Given that only a limited number of copies of the report are available, it has not been possible to make a full distribution. Delegations are therefore requested to have the copies transmitted to them available during discussion of the item.

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Seventy-third session
Item 99 (w) of the preliminary list*
General and complete disarmament

Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Report of the Secretary-General

Contents

		Page
I.	Introduction	2
II.	Replies received from Governments	2
	Cambodia	2
	Cuba	5
	Ecuador	6
	El Salvador	7
	Lebanon	8
	Philippines	8
	Qatar	9
III.	Reply received from the European Union	11
IV.	Replies received from international organizations	14
	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean	14
	Collective Security Treaty Organization	15
	International Civil Aviation Organization	16
	International Criminal Police Organization	17
	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	19
	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	20

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I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 72/42, entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction", called upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; appealed to all Member States to consider early accession to and ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and encouraged States parties to the Convention to review its implementation; and urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

2. The General Assembly encouraged cooperation among and between Member States and relevant regional and international organizations for strengthening national capacities in that regard.

3. Furthermore, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures, including national measures, for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and to report to the Assembly at its seventy-third session. The present report is submitted in response to that request.

4. By a note verbale dated 19 February 2018, Member States were invited to communicate their views on the issue. Similarly, letters dated 18 February 2018 were dispatched to relevant international organizations, including relevant bodies and agencies of the United Nations system. Member States and relevant international organizations were invited to provide executive summaries of their contributions for inclusion in the report of the Secretary-General, while their submissions in extenso would be posted on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (www.un.org/disarmament), if so requested by the Member State or international organization. The replies received are contained in sections II and IV of the present report. A reply from the European Union has been received and is reproduced in section III, in accordance with the modalities set out in resolution 65/276. Any replies received after 15 May 2018 will be posted on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs in the language of submission. No addenda will be issued.

II. Replies received from Governments

Cambodia

[Original: English]
[5 April 2018]

The Royal Government of Cambodia, under the strong leadership of Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia and President of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, is strongly committed to participating regionally and worldwide in the prevention of and protection against terrorism. As a Member of the United Nations, although it has been assessed by the international community as not being a target of a terrorist attack, Cambodia is also partaking in the prevention of and protection against weapons of mass destruction-related terrorism, and terrorist financing, regionally and internationally.

On 14 December 2004 the Government of Cambodia laid out the decision which established the National Committee to command the combating and prevention of terrorism and also established the secretariat of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee under that Committee (in 2005) as an administrative body to implement the policies which the National Committee has laid out so far. The secretariat decides the implementation as follows:

The secretariat of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, an administrative body of the Committee, coordinated training courses, workshops and study tours in the country from 2010 to 2017; about 202 courses were conducted, with 1,946 participants attending from the Ministry of the Interior, the General Commissariat of National Police, the Ministry of National Defence, the Royal Gendarmerie, Brigade 70, the Special Military Region, the Department of Research and Military Intelligence, the 2nd Bureau of the Royal Army headquarters, the General Department of Customs and Excise, the General Department of CamControl, the National Counter-Terrorism Special Force headquarters and the Financial Intelligence Unit of the National Bank of Cambodia. With regard to overseas training courses, the secretariat sent out its staff and those of relevant institutions in Cambodia from 2010 to 2017 to 153 courses, with 410 participants in various countries, such as the United States of America, China, Australia, Japan, Thailand, Germany, Austria, Italy, South Korea, New Zealand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Furthermore, there were 11 tabletop exercises in which leaders and officers from the secretariat participated, as well as other relevant institutions, including the Ministry of National Defence (National Authority for Chemical Weapons), the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Health, the General Department of Customs and Excise, the General Department of CamControl, Brigade 70, the Special Military Region, the Department of Research and Military Intelligence, the 2nd Bureau of the Royal Army headquarters and the Department of Infrastructure Protection of the secretariat of the Committee, who also participated at the Phnom Penh International Airport and Siem Reap International Airport exercises held annually.

In addition, Cambodia being a signatory of United Nation agreements and treaties, the Royal Government of Cambodia has established and practised the relevant laws, which already came into effect, including the Constitutional Law (1993), the Law on the Management of Weapons, Explosives and Ammunition (2005), the Law on Counter-Terrorism (2007), the Criminal Code (2007), the Law on the Prohibition of Chemical, Nuclear, Biological and Radiological Weapons (2009) and the National Planning Book on Counter-Terrorism (2009). Currently, the Ministry of Mines and Energy is drafting the Nuclear Law, and the secretariat of the National Committee has also joined the discussion. Moreover, the secretariat is a member of the chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear working group, which consists of more than 10 ministry representatives, to create a national chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear action plan in order to strengthen Cambodia's capacity to respond to and prevent illegal trafficking in such materials (the action plan's implementation was officially launched on 11 December 2017). The secretariat has also joined the Financial Intelligence Unit, which is under the National Bank of Cambodia, to do a mutual evaluation of terrorist financing and proliferation financing, as well as participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative conference. The secretariat of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee is implementing the resolution on the establishment of the working group (Decision No. 028/17 N.C.T.C.) to review and to update the National Planning Book and to encourage our law enforcement agencies to engage and extend their information seeking and investigation in order to identify issues related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing. Furthermore, the National Counter-Terrorism Strategic Plan is being updated.

With regard to capacity-building, a Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Explosive Unit was established, to be equipped under the National Counter-Terrorism Special Force umbrella within the Special Department of the secretariat of the Committee with regular training. Moreover, the secretariat played a key role in coordinating the Megaports Initiative project to install radiation portal monitors at the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port, installing radiation portal monitors at the Phnom Penh River Port in 2016 (four more pairs of such monitors will be installed at the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port, and a few more will be installed at the Phnom Penh River Port with support from the United States Department of Energy), and provided customs officers with handheld radiation detection equipment at 10 international land border checkpoints and dry ports, the Phnom Penh International Airport and the Siem Reap International Airport. We have also provided handheld radiation detection equipment to our chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives first responder team under the National Counter-Terrorism Special Force headquarters for conferences and national events, as well as security and safety assurances to the public and VIP guests. This radioactive detection equipment was sponsored by the United States Department of Energy, the European Union Joint Research Centre and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We have also created our official website (www.ncte.gov.kh) for posting news on major violent and terrorist incidents in Khmer, as well as for posting the Cambodian Counter-Terrorism Law and other documents.

In addition, the secretariat has coordinated the strategic trade control and export control programme with the United States Department of Energy and project 47 of the European Union (partner-to-partner programme). Awareness-raising was conducted for law enforcement officers from various ministries on the impact of weapons of mass destruction through training and workshops sponsored by IAEA, the United States Department of Energy and the European Union Centre of Excellence, among other institutions.

In the fight against extremism from overseas ideology to prevent it from spreading in the Muslim Cambodian community, and the prevention of ISIS activity in the region through awareness-raising on foreign fighters for relevant agencies in Cambodia, based on the activities mentioned above, the majority of the Islamic people in society help to strengthen the Muslim community and increase its ability to be fundamentally aware of all parts and to accept pluralism (i.e. extremism is not pluralism). Information collection and intelligence sharing between national and regional partners play a vital role in helping each other and fighting against terrorism and prevent ideologies from spreading.

The Kingdom of Cambodia, led by Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo Hun Sen, and its administrative bodies, including the secretariat of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Ministry of the Interior, the General Commissariat of National Police, the Ministry of National Defence, the Royal Gendarmerie, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Industry and Handicraft, the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the Ministry of Health and the National Bank, have been pursuing their own activities in educating, raising awareness and cooperating with other partners, regional and international, within the community. Activities also include the sharing of intelligence information and knowledge related to protection against, prevention of and fight against the illegal smuggling of chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear materials and to preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]
[5 April 2018]

Cuba does not possess and has no intention of possessing weapons of mass destruction, nor are they part of its national defence strategy.

The only effective way to prevent the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction, including by terrorists, is the immediate and complete prohibition of all such weapons and their elimination from the face of the earth. As long as such weapons exist, no action to prevent the occurrence of acts of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction can be sufficient or fully effective.

As a victim of terrorism, Cuba has never allowed and will never allow terrorist acts of any kind against any State to be carried out, planned or financed on its territory.

Cuba strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including State terrorism, by whomever, against whomsoever and wherever committed, regardless of motivation. Cuba further condemns any action aimed at encouraging, supporting, financing or covering up any terrorist act, method or practice.

Cuba has maintained a firm and consistent position against terrorism. Cuba is a State party to 16 terrorism-related international conventions, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which is mentioned explicitly in General Assembly resolution 68/41. In 2013, Cuba ratified the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation, and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It also strictly complies with its obligations arising from, inter alia, Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004).

In 2013, Cuba played an active role in the International Conference on Nuclear Security, which was organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Cuba has expressed its support for the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, approved by the IAEA Board of Governors, while recognizing that the Code, like the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, is not legally binding.

Cuba has adopted a set of legislative, administrative and institutional measures designed to ensure that no terrorist acts, in any of their forms or manifestations, are committed on its territory, including measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

For example, Act No. 93 (the Counter-Terrorism Act), adopted in December 2001, strengthens national measures to prevent Cuba, which has no weapons of mass destruction and repudiates their use, from serving as a channel for the acquisition of such weapons or their components by terrorists.

Cuba attaches great importance to the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, an instrument that should guide the global struggle against this scourge.

The existence of more than 17,000 nuclear weapons, their continuing development and their possible use are a serious threat to the survival of the human species. There is an urgent need to commence negotiations for the prompt conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear disarmament.

The destruction of all categories of chemical weapons within the shortest possible time should continue to be one of the main priorities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). This would make a significant contribution to international efforts to ensure that these weapons of mass destruction do not fall into the hands of terrorists.

Cuba welcomes the accession of Syria to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the agreements reached on the elimination of its chemical weapons stockpile and the progress that has been made under existing commitments. Cuba encourages the international community to continue supporting the process of destruction of Syrian chemical weapons.

Cuba reiterates the need to strengthen the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction through the negotiation of a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding protocol for the verification of compliance with the Convention, with pillars that include assistance and cooperation to ensure that such weapons are never used by or against anyone.

Efforts to counter acts of terrorism, including with weapons of mass destruction, must be universal and must involve effective multilateral agreement through genuinely effective international cooperation to prevent and combat all acts of terrorism, with strict respect for international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

Ecuador

[Original: Spanish]
[8 May 2018]

The Constitution of Ecuador expressly condemns the production, possession, commercialization, importation, transfer, stockpiling and use of weapons of mass destruction, regardless of who does it. The Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code of Ecuador establishes severe penalties for any person who develops, produces, manufactures, uses, acquires, possesses, distributes, stockpiles, holds, transports, transits, imports, exports, re-exports or markets chemical, biological and toxin or nuclear weapons. On 27 June 2017, the National Assembly of Ecuador approved, as a step prior to ratification, the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, thereby reiterating the commitment of Ecuador to fighting sabotage and smuggling of nuclear materials and their possible use for terrorist purposes.

Ecuador played an active role in the International Conference on Nuclear Security held in December 2016 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which organized the meeting as the appropriate forum for addressing challenges in the field of physical nuclear security in an inclusive manner, where all IAEA member States were represented and expressed their ideas and their commitments. Ecuador is concerned that issues of universal interest, such as nuclear security, are addressed in forums with limited participation that are outside the framework of the United Nations or its specialized agencies and bodies and in which only a few States participate.

The Government of Ecuador believes that as long as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons remain in the possession of States, there is a risk of their use. For this reason, when we speak of weapons of mass destruction and the risk of their proliferation to non-State actors, we cannot overlook the primary responsibility of States to fulfil their obligations under the various international, universal or regional

instruments in this sphere, including the destruction of such weapons, without forgetting that 85 per cent of the nuclear material existing in the world is for military purposes. By its very nature, then, it is outside the scope of international nuclear-security agreements.

The only weapons of mass destruction that had not been prohibited by a universal legally binding instrument were nuclear weapons. On 7 July 2017, this lacuna was filled with the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Through its active participation in the negotiation and adoption of this Treaty, Ecuador has complied with its obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

It should be recalled that as long as stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction exist, there is a high risk of their being used for criminal or terrorist purposes. Accordingly, the best guarantee that this does not occur is to eliminate them completely.

El Salvador

[Original: Spanish]
[15 May 2018]

El Salvador, as a founding member and signatory of the Charter of the United Nations, maintains its strong commitment and unconditional support for all initiatives to promote and strengthen the fight against organized crime and terrorism, international security, disarmament and the culture of peace at the global level, giving priority to the protection of and respect for human rights. Accordingly, El Salvador is deeply concerned at the various attacks, conflicts and threats to international peace and security that have been occurring throughout the world, and it deeply regrets the loss of life, particularly of children, caused by indiscriminate attacks perpetrated in various regions of the world. El Salvador therefore considers it important that the international community work together with the United Nations and other relevant international organizations to seek peaceful solutions to these devastating occurrences, including by promoting disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, taking into account the provisions of international law, including human rights law and international humanitarian law.

This is why El Salvador does not possess, import, produce or stockpile weapons of mass destruction, and with this stance it reaffirms its right and, moreover, is aware of its obligation to work for general disarmament to ensure peace and international security.

In that regard, El Salvador considers that all initiatives and actions in favour of disarmament of weapons of mass destruction and the control of conventional weapons, especially small arms, are important contributions and effective measures for preventing terrorist and criminal structures from having access to all types of weapons, and they thereby reduce and even eliminate the armed violence and human suffering caused by these groups.

El Salvador therefore gives special emphasis to the mandate established through Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), taking into account that its main objective is to prevent the provision of any kind of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in order to strengthen national controls and ensure international security.

In that context, El Salvador is working through various national institutions such as the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Directorate

General of Customs, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, among others, with the support of United Nations experts from the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), on the development and implementation of an action plan and a national mechanism to implement effectively the provisions of the resolution at the national level and to develop the relevant domestic law.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[11 May 2018]

Army Command would like to state the following:

Lebanon possesses no weapons of mass destruction and complies with United Nations resolutions prohibiting the use or acquisition of such weapons by terrorists.

Lebanon has introduced laws and regulations that allow it to monitor the export, transit and cross-border movement of weapons of all kinds, prohibit trafficking in such weapons, and prosecute any terrorists. Lebanese law prohibits terrorism and provides that terrorists must be prosecuted.

Lebanon supports closer cooperation between States and has contributed to international counter-terrorism efforts. It has put in place strict deterrent laws and regulations concerning the surveillance and prosecution of any terrorists.

Lebanon is combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and is also working to curb armament, with a view to establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Moreover, it is opposed to the threat or use of such weapons.

Lebanon condemns all forms of terrorism.

Lebanon believes that the international community must make a concerted and collective effort to counter terrorism.

Lebanon expresses grave concern that the Israeli enemy's failure to comply with international law poses a threat to all countries in the region.

Philippines

[Original: English]
[9 May 2018]

On 13 November 2015, Republic Act No. 10697, "An Act Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Managing the Trade in Strategic Goods, the Provision of Related Services, and for Other Purposes", otherwise known as the Strategic Trade Management Act, was signed and enacted into law.

The Act was enacted consistent with the Philippines' national interest and to fulfil its international commitments and obligations, including under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The said law enforces measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to, from or within the Philippines. The Act's main objective is to maintain international peace and security and promote economic growth by facilitating trade and investment through the responsible management of strategic goods and the provision of related services.

In relation to this, the Department of Trade and Industry — Strategic Trade Management Office, a bureau under the administrative supervision of the Department, was designated as the executive and technical arm for the establishment of management systems for trade in strategic goods pursuant to the Act. In essence, the Office will be regulating and monitoring strategic goods to prevent their unlawful acquisition.

Currently, the Office is preparing the guidelines and handbooks that will be referenced by government and industry stakeholders prior to the full implementation of the Act. The Office is awaiting the publication of the Act's implementing rules and regulations, which were approved by the National Security Council — Strategic Trade Management Committee on 31 August 2017, before the Act can be properly and fully implemented.

Qatar

[Original: Arabic]
[10 April 2018]

- Qatar is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. It has also concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- Qatar has concluded numerous bilateral agreements and memorandums of understanding concerning security cooperation that include provisions pertaining to counter-terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
- In 2004, Qatar established the National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons.
- Act No. 3 (2004) concerning counter-terrorism was enacted.
- In 2007, Qatar established the National Counter-Terrorism Committee.
- Act No. 16 (2013) concerning chemical weapons was enacted. This law sets out rules for the use of and imposes strict controls on chemical materials, in order to prevent their misuse and ensure that they do not fall into the hands of outlaws.
- Act No. 4 (2016) on biological weapons includes a list that is known as the controlled substances list. Biological agents and toxins that are subject to controls are included that list. The Act also includes several articles that regulate how biological agents and toxins should be handled, and it puts in place regulatory restrictions on such substances, in order to prevent them from being misused to manufacture biological weapons.
- In 2008, a workshop on nuclear radiation was organized in cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
- In 2009, Qatar hosted a workshop on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) that was organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

- In December 2013, Qatar, in cooperation with the United States of America, organized a conference to counter the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- In March 2015, Qatar hosted the eleventh annual NATO conference on weapons of mass destruction.
- On 15 and 16 December 2015, Qatar, in cooperation with the United States of America, organized a symposium on transit transportation.
- Act No. 18 (2010) on countering money-laundering and the financing of terrorism was enacted.
- In 2002, Qatar established the National Committee to Combat Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism. The Committee was reorganized in 2010.
- Qatar has organized several events in cooperation with OPCW:
  - The fifth regional meeting of national authorities of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in Asia took place from 4 to 6 September 2007.
  - From October 2008 to 15 April 2018, Qatar hosted and funded several events in cooperation with OPCW:

    1. On seven occasions, Qatar hosted a training course for representatives of the national authorities of Asian States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention on fulfilling article VI declaration requirements.

    2. On eight occasions, Qatar hosted a subregional training course on the technical aspects of transportation systems for the customs agencies of the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

    3. From 20 to 22 November 2011, Qatar hosted a training course on the Chemical Weapons Convention and chemical safety for GCC member States that are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    4. On seven occasions, Qatar hosted a symposium for Asian States members of OPCW on the Chemical Weapons Convention and chemical safety and security management.

    5. In 2014 and 2015, Qatar hosted the regional meeting of representatives of the chemical industry and the national authorities of Asian States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    6. On seven occasions, Qatar hosted workshops, training courses and practical exercises regarding the coordination of assistance and protection under article X of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    7. International Conference on Chemical Disarmament and Security: the contributions of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to global peace and security. This conference took place on 10 and 11 April 2017 and was organized in cooperation with OPCW.
- The National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons organizes annual awareness-raising workshops on weapons of mass destruction for all social groups, including secondary school and university students.
- In 2012, in cooperation with OPCW, Qatar established the Doha regional centre for training on conventions concerning weapons of mass destruction. The centre offers training on all instruments concerning weapons of mass destruction.

- Four seminars on the Biological Weapons Convention were organized. Experts from Qatar and abroad participated in those seminars, which addressed the issues of implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention and responding to biological threats. The purpose of those seminars was to raise awareness among workers in State institutions, universities, laboratories and other relevant institutions on how to deal with biological materials; understand the lessons learned from previous attempts to assess and address the impact of biological diseases on human beings and the environment; and train national personnel to implement the Biological Weapons Act in Qatar, combat terrorism by applying biosecurity methods and keep pace with scientific and technical developments in relation to the prohibition of biological weapons.

- A law on accounting for and controlling nuclear materials was adopted. That law includes several provisions concerning the control and handling of nuclear materials, in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of outlaws and being misused to manufacture nuclear weapons.

III. Reply received from the European Union

[Original: English]
[15 May 2018]

The European Union remains strongly committed to preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missiles materials, technical know-how and technology. This commitment is based on the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Union Global Strategy (2016), the European Security Strategy (2003), the European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003), the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005) and the New Lines for Action in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (2008, 2013). The European Union and its member States apply comprehensive export controls and stringently implement resolutions 1540 (2004), 1887 (2009), 1977 (2011) and 2325 (2016). All European Union agreements with third countries contain a clause on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

While States bear the prime responsibility for nuclear security, international cooperation helps to strengthen it. Together with the bilateral contributions from its member States, the European Union is the second largest donor to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund. The European Union financial contribution based on seven successive Council Joint Actions/Decisions has reached more than €45 million for the period 2009–2017. Building on the success and lessons learned from Council Decision 2013/517/CFSP, the European Union adopted a seventh Council Decision supporting the IAEA nuclear security activities undertaken under the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for the period 2017–2019.

The European Union continued to support the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and its mission to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism. The European Union and its member States are actively involved in the work of the Initiative's Implementation and Assessment Group in all areas: nuclear detection, nuclear forensics and response and mitigation. The European Union has actively contributed to the substance of all reference documents of the Group's working groups. The European Union and its member States organize and participate in events to help to foster international awareness and commitment to nuclear security, such as the Sentinel 2017 Workshop: Best Practices for National Nuclear Security Exercise programmes organized by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Bulgaria, under the auspices of the Initiative, the Magic Maggiore

technical reach-back workshop organized at the Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy, the Vigilant Marmot legal frameworks workshop organized by Slovakia together with Canada and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime within the framework of the Initiative, and Exercise Olympus: Law Enforcement and Technical Reach-Back Dialogue, organized by the Government of Romania in cooperation with the Initiative and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

The European Union Nuclear Security Training Centre for the detection of and response to illicit acts with nuclear and other radioactive materials has been fully operational since 2013 for the benefit of European Union member States and partner countries, among them several members of the Initiative. The Centre is operated by the European Union Joint Research Centre at its sites in Karlsruhe, Germany, and Ispra, Italy, in close cooperation with other international initiatives promoted by IAEA and several partner countries of the Initiative. The Centre is also used for practical exercises related mainly to countering nuclear smuggling.

The European Commission and European Union member States continued their nuclear forensics activities on the basic characterization of intercepted nuclear material, using an advanced nuclear forensic investigation at the Joint Research Centre Institute for Transuranium Elements. Overall, nuclear materials detected and seized in more than 50 incidents have been examined, thus providing support to competent authorities in European Union member States and beyond.

The European Union and its member States have been in the forefront of international efforts to achieve a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and continue to call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of such negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. The European Union and its member States support the ongoing work on nuclear disarmament verification with the aim of developing appropriate multilateral technical capabilities and welcome the establishment of the group of governmental experts on the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament. The European Union has participated in the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification since its inauguration.

In order to help to implement the outcome of the 2016 comprehensive review and to support the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), on 11 May 2017, the European Union adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 in support of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The support provided aims to help to enhance relevant national and regional efforts and capabilities, primarily through training, capacity-building and assistance facilitation in close coordination with other European Union programmes and other actors involved in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004); to ensure synergies and complementarity; to contribute to the practical implementation of specific recommendations of both the 2009 comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and the outcome of the comprehensive review conducted during 2016, in particular in the areas of technical assistance, international cooperation and raising public awareness; to support the development of voluntary resolution 1540 (2004) national implementation action plans upon States' request; and to promote the engagement of relevant stakeholders from industry and civil society in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

The European Union Centres of Excellence on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation initiative is a worldwide capacity-building programme, gathering 60 partner countries grouped around eight regional

secretariat, located in the following regions: African Atlantic façade; Central Asia; Eastern and Central Africa; Gulf Cooperation Council countries; Middle East; North Africa and Sahel; South-East Asia; and South-East and Eastern Europe.

The Centres of Excellence initiative is financed under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and aims to mitigate risks related to such materials, strengthen partner countries' preparedness and nurture a security culture and governance. Participating countries are supported in their efforts to establish, on a voluntary basis and following a bottom-up, regional approach, national and regional coordination and governance structures. These platforms develop policy proposals and capacities based on specific needs assessments and national action plans. They are supported through several regional cooperation projects funded under the initiative and open to other financing instruments. Since 2010, 66 regional projects have been financed. The budget for the Initiative for the 10-year period starting in 2010 amounts to €250 million.

The Centres of Excellence network is now well developed and allowed the European Union to undertake tabletop training and field cross-border exercises on matters including civil protection, incident response, biosecurity and waste management in the framework of Centres of Excellence projects, in order to enhance visibility and concretely assess their impact. Moreover, the initiative is mature enough to support further actions addressing security governance issues related to cybercrime, terrorism, critical infrastructures, falsified medicines, hybrid threats and explosives, as well as to further develop cooperation on nuclear forensics, border control and export control of dual-use items.

In October 2017, the European Commission presented, as part of a wider counter-terrorism package, an action plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks. The new Action Plan, building on the achievements of the European Union Action Plan on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security 2010–2015, proposes a wide range of measures to improve preparedness, resilience and coordination at the European Union level. It underlines the importance of close links between internal and external chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security-related activities, as well as cooperation with specialized multilateral organizations, such as IAEA, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and INTERPOL. The Action Plan has received scientific and technical support from a range of research covering the entire crisis management cycle, from prevention to recovery.

Despite the lack of agreement on an intersessional work programme at the Eighth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, held from 7 to 25 November 2016, the European Union continued its strong political and financial support for the implementation and the universalization of the Convention, including through the consistent and comprehensive implementation by the Convention's Implementation Support Unit of the fourth European Union assistance programme laid down in Council Decision 2016/51/CFSP. Two regional workshops supporting universal adherence to the Convention in the Pacific region and enhanced dialogue on science and technology in Eastern Europe and Central Asia were organized. Ten extended assistance programmes on the national implementation of the Convention have been launched by the Unit as well. These efforts will help to support the new intersessional work programme agreed at the December 2017 Meeting of States Parties, in particular the work of the Meeting of Experts on strengthening national implementation.

The European Union continued to support OPCW with voluntary contributions to the Chemical Weapons Convention's core objectives and OPCW special operations regarding Syria's chemical weapons programme. The European Union supported the

OPCW Director General's decision that the fact-finding mission continue its work and that the Declaration Assessment Team continue to examine gaps and discrepancies in the Syrian declarations. The European Union welcomed the adoption of resolution 2319 (2016) extending by one year the mandate of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism established by resolution 2235 (2015) to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria, while noting with great concern that the Security Council was prevented from renewing the Mechanism's mandate again in 2017. By way of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2215, adopted on 30 November 2015, the European Union had provided financial support in the amount of €4.6 million for the costs associated with the Joint Investigative Mechanism activities under resolution 2235 (2015). With Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2303 of 12 December 2017 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2302 of 12 December 2017, the European Union provided assistance to OPCW for the provision of satellite imagery in support of operations in Syria (€1 million) and for the decontamination of the former storage site of Libyan chemical weapons in Ruwagha (€3.3 million).

The European Union supports the implementation and functioning of and universal adherence to the only multilateral transparency and confidence-building instrument against ballistic missile proliferation, the Hague Code of Conduct. A Council Decision worth €1.9 million supporting these activities was adopted for the period 2017–2021.

IV. Replies received from international organizations

Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

[Original: English]
[20 April 2018]

Article 1 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), regarding the obligations of the States parties, covers all aspects concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapons:

(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way;

(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.

The activities prohibited in article 1 are addressed to the parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way. Consequently, States parties undertake to avoid, in their national territories, having any non-State actor, including terrorists, produce, test, acquire or deploy nuclear weapons.

Verification of compliance with the obligations contained in article 1 is performed in accordance with articles 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21 of the Treaty. These articles constitute the control system. It has the purpose of verifying that none of the activities prohibited in article 1 of the Treaty are carried out in the territory of the contracting parties with nuclear materials or weapons introduced from abroad. This includes the obligation of States parties to conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of safeguards to their nuclear activities (art. 13). All the States party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco have concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA, in accordance with both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The 33 States party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco compose the membership of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL). In accordance with article 14, the parties undertake to submit to OPANAL semi-annual reports stating that no activity prohibited under the Treaty has occurred in their respective territories. This, of course, covers activities by non-State actors.

Since the adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, the control system has shown thorough compliance of the States parties through OPANAL.

The States members of OPANAL have also sustained that the Treaty of Tlatelolco is not limited to keeping the region free of nuclear weapons. The Latin American and Caribbean nuclear-weapon-free zone is understood as a practical contribution to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

On the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2017, the 33 States members of OPANAL stated in their Declaration that the elimination of nuclear weapons is the only truly effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

It should be noted that 17 States members of OPANAL are party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and 4 other States members of OPANAL have signed it.

Collective Security Treaty Organization

[Original: Russian]
[15 May 2018]

The Foreign Ministries of States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization participate in expert-level consultations on disarmament each year in order to discuss the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the need for additional measures to minimize the global threats associated with the proliferation of such weapons. The most recent consultations took place in March 2018.

The working group of experts on countering terrorism and extremism meets regularly to coordinate joint activities and share information in that regard.

The most recent meeting of the working group took place on 18 April 2018. At that meeting, information was shared on an assessment of the situation, taking into account the new challenges and threats faced by the member States of the Organization, and proposals for enhancing international counter-terrorism efforts were made.

Practical issues relating to counter-terrorism are considered during joint operational and combat preparation initiatives of the Organization's Collective Rapid Reaction Force.

A special tactical exercise with the "Kobalt 2018" special forces unit is planned for May 2018 in the Republic of Kazakhstan in order to work out how to organize special operations aimed at preventing the activities of terrorist and extremist groups.

Following the establishment on 15 June 2017 of the Office of Counter-Terrorism to coordinate the efforts of United Nations entities relating, to one degree or another, to counter-terrorism, on 3 April 2018, the Deputy Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Valery Semerikov, and the Under-Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, Vladimir Voronkov, discussed at a bilateral meeting possible joint measures to counter transnational

organized crime, terrorism, illegal migration and drug trafficking and agreed on the drafting and signing of a memorandum of understanding between the secretariat of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Office of Counter-Terrorism.

Implementation of the memorandum will help to coordinate the efforts of the relevant entities of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the United Nations to counter terrorism, extremism and other threats to international security, including efforts to prevent the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction.

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

[Original: English]
[15 May 2018]

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) supports the counter-terrorism objectives set out in General Assembly resolution 72/42, entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction", by enhancing the security of the international civil aviation system through international legal instruments on counter-terrorism and through development and review of the Standards and Recommended Practices in annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

ICAO continue to promote the acceptance of the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Beijing Convention), which has not yet entered into force. The Beijing Convention criminalizes acts of using civil aircraft for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury or serious damage; of using civil aircraft to release or discharge any biological, chemical or nuclear weapon or similar substances to cause death, serious bodily injury or serious damage; and of using any such weapon or similar substances on board or against civil aircraft. It further criminalizes the unlawful transport of any such weapon, related material or other dangerous material. Various resolutions were passed during the 39th Session of the ICAO Assembly encouraging States to sign and ratify the Convention as soon as possible.

Recognizing the potential use of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons by terrorists, ICAO continues to identify possible mitigating measures for these threats. While preventing the acquisition of such weapons can be challenging, mitigating the effects of a biological, chemical or nuclear attack may deter terrorists from carrying out such assaults.

ICAO has recently completed the development of guidance material that addresses key high-level elements of an emergency response plan aimed at mitigating the effects of attacks on aviation facilities, including on board aircraft, using chemical, biological and radiological agents. The publication, to be made available through the ICAO secure portal, constitutes a solid basis for the development by competent authorities of a full-fledged emergency response plan to chemical, biological and radiological attacks on aviation facilities. While the guidance material focuses on response and recovery, it is envisaged that future updates to the publication may address the issue of detection of chemical, biological and radiological agents.

With regard to the legal transport of dangerous goods as cargo on aircraft, annex 18, The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, together with the detailed provisions contained in the Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, 2017–2018 edition, provides States with an internationally agreed set of provisions governing their safe transport for all international operations of civil aircraft. With regard to high-consequence dangerous goods, additional security

measures are contained therein. Furthermore, ICAO has worked with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to facilitate the latter's work when transporting samples for analysis.

International Criminal Police Organization

[Original: English]
[10 May 2018]

Terrorism that makes use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials poses a clear threat to public health and safety, national security and economic and political stability on a global scale. As such, the prevention of such incidents is of the highest priority. The threat of such terrorism is evolving and, with it, the risk of incidents intended to maximize the number of victims on a global scale. Recent incidents both within and outside conflict zones prove that terrorists are working hard to acquire such materials and the expertise to use them in their operations.

In 2010, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) made the strategic decision to launch a comprehensive chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism prevention and response capability in support of its 192 member countries. INTERPOL has since significantly increased its capacity to assist member countries in reducing and countering the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats from non-State actors. A specialized subdirectorate was established, adopting an intelligence-driven, prevention-oriented, cross-sector approach, structured around three distinct units: the Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit, the Bioterrorism Prevention Unit and the Chemical and Explosives Terrorism Prevention Unit.

In this regard, the INTERPOL Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (AG-2016-RES-03) defines the INTERPOL mission in Action Stream 4, Weapons and Materials, by assisting member countries in the identification, tracking and interception of the illicit trafficking of weapons and materials necessary for terrorist activities. The key objectives in relation to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and materials are structured around the following pillars:

1. Facilitate intelligence sharing among member countries about subjects and modus operandi linked to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents

Facilitating the exchange of information among member countries in a secure fashion and identifying criminals and criminal organizations through intelligence analysis represent the ground base of the work of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives Subdirectorate.

The Subdirectorate collects information on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents; analyses the information and conducts threat assessments; shares intelligence and analysis regarding chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats and incidents with INTERPOL member countries and partner agencies through bimonthly (INTERPOL CBRNE Digest) and ad hoc reports.

Specialized databases such as Geiger and Watchmaker provide operational and specialized support to member countries through the sharing of INTERPOL notices and warning messages on individuals involved in illegal chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear activities.

2. Enhance the capacity of member countries to prevent and respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks by establishing countermeasure programmes

Given the severity of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks and their transnational consequences, preparedness and prevention are essential elements in both national and regional strategies. INTERPOL continues to engage in capacity-building efforts to increase the level of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear awareness and preparedness within member countries.

This is accomplished by providing prevention methodologies and guidance materials and delivering specialized training sessions and tabletop exercises in order to enhance law enforcement capacity to prevent and respond more efficiently to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks.

3. Design and coordinate cross-border intelligence-led inter-agency operations to intercept the illicit trafficking of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials

Identifying, interdicting and investigating cross-border illicit trafficking of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials require effective multi-agency coordination at both the national and transnational levels. The combination of the INTERPOL mandate and its policing capabilities (i.e. databases, intelligence analysis, border security, training and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives specialized expertise) facilitates and guides the implementation of enhanced border controls in support of national counter-terrorism efforts targeting the disruption of illicit movement of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials.

The implementation of such operational methodology draws on INTERPOL policing capabilities and adopts the concept of multi-agency training sessions translated into operational frameworks. The locations of operations are always shaped by tactical and strategic analysis findings and determined in close consultation with participating member countries.

4. Maintain and develop strategic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives partnerships on a global scale

Since the establishment of its chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capacity, INTERPOL has become an important component of the global mechanism to prevent and respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism. INTERPOL continues to adopt a dual-track global engagement policy allowing it to:

(a) Further consolidate its integration of all major relevant multinational frameworks (e.g. resolution 1540 (2004) and its Committee, the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Health Security Agenda, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, etc.);

(b) Maintain and establish sustainable bilateral partnership frameworks with the most relevant international partner agencies (e.g. the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the World Health Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health, etc.).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization*

[Original: English]
[4 May 2018]

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Heads of State and Government have on numerous occasions called for universal adherence to and compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the additional protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreement, as well as for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and further work under resolution 1977 (2011). Reference to them is made in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué, dated 9 July 2016, in paragraphs 63 to 66.

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence capabilities

The NATO 2009 Comprehensive, Strategic-level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats as the overarching policy document is still valid, comprehensive and flexible enough to deal with the evolving threats. Its implementation is continuously ongoing and driving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capability development.

The multinational Combined Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Task Force, which is composed of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Joint Assessment Team, the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion and the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear component of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, is the key asset for protection against and response to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks from State and non-State actors or incidents involving such material. The NATO Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence, with its chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear reach-back capability, is able to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week, on a limited basis and provides scientific and operational advice before, during and after chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents. The chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear reach-back capability provides an essential and effective contribution to the entire spectrum of NATO response to weapons of mass destruction proliferation, protection and recovery.

NATO chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence activities aiming for prevention and protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats from State and non-State actors are supported by the Committee on Proliferation in Defence format, the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Capability Development Group, the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Medical Working Group, the Joint Centre of Excellence, the Defence against Terrorism Programme of Work and subject matter experts throughout the NATO command structure.

Cooperation with partners

NATO is investigating ways to improve the military's ability to provide support to civilian authorities in response to an overwhelming mass casualty chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incident. This may also be relevant to future NATO cooperation with the new Office of Counter-Terrorism of the United Nations. A separate strand of work seeks to develop a better understanding of ways that counter-

* The full text of the information provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs. A summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.

terrorism may benefit from defence capability development, including for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence.

Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and with other partners across the globe, NATO has deepened cooperation and information sharing on weapons of mass destruction threats and strengthened non-proliferation initiatives.

As one of the largest NATO outreach activities, the Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation gathers decision makers, senior officials and distinguished academics in the field of weapons of mass destruction and security from a wide range of countries. The next Conference will take place in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 2018.

Science cooperation

The NATO Science for Peace and Security programme supports practical security-related civil science research and technology collaboration between scientists and experts from NATO and partner countries. The programme directly facilitates mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest to NATO and partner countries and contributes to capacity-building, particularly to international efforts on meeting emerging security challenges, including counter-terrorism and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

[Original: English]
[30 April 2018]

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) continued promoting the seven international legal instruments dealing with the criminalization of certain forms of conduct by non-State actors involving chemical, biological, radiological and/or nuclear materials, as well as the implementation of relevant obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

To that end, the Office organized a workshop on the dual use of chemical materials for terrorism purposes for Iraq, held in Beirut from 12 to 15 August 2017, complemented by related study visits to the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, the International Criminal Police Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the World Customs Organization from 9 to 20 October 2017.

In 2017, UNODC also cooperated with Canada in co-chairing an event in Vienna commemorating the tenth anniversary of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and in co-organizing a workshop in Bratislava on legal frameworks in nuclear security, under the aegis of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Furthermore, the Office participated in other events under the Initiative, including, by video message, at the tenth plenary meeting of the Initiative, in Tokyo in June 2017. In addition, UNODC was represented at an OPCW meeting on chemical security held in The Hague in September 2017.

UNODC participated in a legislative drafting workshop on nuclear smuggling organized by the United States of America for Ukraine, held in Kyiv on 24 and 25 July 2017.